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The Treasury Auction Process: Objectives, Structure,
and Recent Adaptations
Kenneth D. Garbade and Jeffrey F. Ingber
Treasury auctions are designed to minimize the cost of financing the national debt by promoting
broad, competitive bidding and liquid secondary market trading. A review of the auction
process—from the announcement of a new issue to the delivery of securities—reveals how these
objectives have been met. Also highlighted are changes in the auction process that stem from
recent advances in information-processing technologies and risk management techniques.
T
he stated goal of Treasury debt management is
to meet the financing needs of the federal gov-
ernment at the lowest cost over time.1 Since
Treasury auctions provide the principal means of financ-
ing the federal deficit and refinancing maturing debt,
Treasury officials have sought to structure the auction
process to minimize the government’s costs,both directly
by promoting broad,competitive bidding and indirectly
by promoting liquid post-auction secondary markets for
new issues.2
This edition of Current Issues offers a concise explana-
tion of the modern Treasury auction process.We follow the
process from the announcement of a new issue to the
delivery of the new securities,looking at key aspects of the
process such as the form of bidding and restrictions on
tenders and awards.
We also consider why,and how,the auction process has
changed in recent decades.Treasury bills were first auc-
tioned in 1929; coupon-bearing securities,in 1970.Given
this lengthy history,an observer might reasonably hypoth-
esize that an efficiently administered auction process
would have long since converged to some optimal form.
Surprisingly, however, the process continues to evolve.
Understanding the nature of,and reasons for,this persistent
change is important for both public officials and private
market participants.We suggest that it reflects adaptations
to new developments in the financial services industry,such
as futures trading and net settlement,and advances in com-
munications and information-processing technologies.
Treasury Securities
The federal government presently auctions three types of
marketable securities:bills,notes,and Treasury inflation-
protected securities (TIPS).Bills are single-payment securi-
ties that are sold at a discount and pay a specified face
amount at maturity.Notes are interest-bearing obligations
that pay interest semiannually both prior to and at maturity
and repay principal at maturity.TIPS are interest-bearing
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securities whose payments are indexed to the monthly non-
seasonally adjusted U.S. City Average All Items Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers, published by the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The Treasury auctions an astonishing quantity of securities.
In calendar year 2003,it auctioned $3.42 trillion of securities,
including $2.78 trillion face amount of bills,$616 billion prin-
cipal amount of notes, and $26 billion indexed principal
amount of TIPS,in a total of 202 auctions.Most of the auction
proceeds went to redeem maturing issues ($2.83 trillion) or to
bridge short-term gaps between expenditures and receipts
($229 billion),but $363 billion was new money.
Marketable Treasury securities come in two forms:
entries in book-entry accounts at Federal Reserve Banks and
entries in book-entry accounts in TreasuryDirect.T h e
Federal Reserve book-entry securities system is operated by
the Federal Reserve District Banks in their own capacity and
as fiscal agents for the United States.The system maintains the
primary records of bill,note,and TIPS holdings of depository
institutions and certain other entities.(Depository institu-
tions hold book-entry securities on behalf of their customers
as well as for their own account.) TreasuryDirect is a propri-
etary Treasury book-entry system introduced in 1986 to
accommodate retail investors that buy securities at original
issue and typically hold them to maturity.
The Auction Announcement and When-Issued Trading
The Treasury auction process begins with an announcement
by the Treasury that it will soon auction a specified quantity
of a particular security.For example,at 11 a.m.on Monday,
August 23,2004,the Treasury announced that it would auction
$24 billion of new two-year notes on August 25 for delivery
and payment on Tuesday,August 31.The announcement did
not specify a coupon rate for the notes.As explained below,
the auction would determine the coupon rate as well as the
issue price of the notes. Note, however, that the Treasury
sometimes “reopens” a security by selling additional
amounts of an outstanding issue.In the case of a note or
TIPS reopening, the coupon rate on the new securities is
identical to that on the outstanding securities and is not
determined in the auction process.
Immediately following the announcement of a forthcom-
ing auction,dealers and other market participants begin to
trade the new security on a when-issued basis.Secondary
market transactions in outstanding Treasury securities typi-
cally settle on the business day after the trade date,when
sellers deliver securities to buyers and receive payment.
When-issued transactions,by contrast,settle on the issue
date of the new security (which can be as much as a week or
more after a trade is negotiated) because the security is not
available for delivery at any earlier date.
When-issued trading enables market participants to con-
tract for the purchase and sale of a new security before the
security has been auctioned.This type of trading is important
because public dissemination of the yield at which a new note
is trading,or the discount rate at which a new bill is trading,
provides valuable information about the market’s appraisal of
the prospective value of the security.The Joint Report on
the Government Securities Market prepared by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System pointed out that when-issued trading
“reduces uncertainties surrounding Treasury auctions by
serving as a price discovery mechanism.Potential ...bidders
look to when-issued trading levels as a market gauge of demand
in determining how to bid at an auction” (1992, p. A-6).
When-issued trading thus contributes to the Treasury’s goal
of promoting competitive auctions by enhancing market
transparency.
A particularly important part of pre-auction when-issued
trading involves purchases by private investors from dealers.3
The purchases have two significant distributional effects.
First,they facilitate distribution of a new issue ahead of its
auction. The Joint Report noted that when-issued trading
“benefits the T reasury by ...stretching out the actual distribu-
tion period for each issue,...allowing the market more time
to absorb large issues without disruption” (p. 9). Second,
when-issued sales by dealers to private investors leave the
dealers with a need to make offsetting purchases in the auc-
tion,concentrating bidding interest in the hands of market
participants that have a substantial financial incentive to
identify correctly the price that balances demand with supply.
Auction Structure
An auction market participant can submit either (a) one or
more competitive bids,each specifying a minimum yield at
which the participant is prepared to buy a specified quantity
of notes (or a minimum discount rate at which it is prepared to
buy a specified quantity of bills),or (b) a single noncompetitive
bid,specifying the quantity of securities that it is prepared to
buy at whatever price is paid by successful competitive bid-
ders.4 Noncompetitive bids are limited to $5 million and are
usually due before 12:00 noon (ET) on the day of an auction.5
Competitive bidding usually closes at 1:00 p.m.
The Treasury conducts note auctions in a “single-price”for-
mat.After the close of bidding,it subtracts the noncompetitive
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bids from the total quantity of securities offered and then
accepts competitive bids,in order of increasing yield,until it
has exhausted the offering. The highest accepted yield is
called the “stop.”Bids specifying yields below the stop are
filled in full,bids above the stop are rejected,and bids at the
stop are filled on a pro rata basis.6 All auction awards are
made at a single price,computed from the yield at which the
auction stopped.If the note does not reopen an outstanding
note,the coupon rate on the note is set at the highest level,in
increments of 1/8 percent, that does not result in a price
greater than 100 percent of principal (see the example in Box
1).Bill and TIPS auctions are similar,except that competitive
bids for bills are specified in terms of discount rates rather
than yields and there is no coupon rate on a bill.
The 1990s witnessed several important changes in auc-
tion structure,including a change from a multiple-price
format (in which successful competitive bidders paid prices
computed from their own bid yields rather than from the
stop), a significant elaboration of restrictions on auction
awards, and an increase in the arithmetic precision with
which bids are expressed.Each of the changes was motivated
by the Treasury’s interest in promoting competitive bidding
and liquid secondary markets.
Auction format. The best-known feature of a Treasury auc-
tion—the single-price format—was introduced in 1992.
The change from the earlier multiple-price format was part
of a major overhaul of the auction process that followed sev-
eral violations of auction rules in 1991.
The Treasury first adopted the multiple-price format
when it initiated bill auctions in 1929 and it continued to use
that format when it introduced auctions of coupon-bearing
securities in the early 1970s. However, when the auction
process came under scrutiny in 1991,public officials became
interested in alternative formats that might appeal to more
investors and that might lead to lower financing costs.
Several academics had suggested earlier that single-price
auctions might reduce financing costs (see Carson [1959],
Friedman [1960,1963],and Smith [1966]).In a single-price
auction,a participant can bid its actual reservation yield for
a new security,that is,the minimum yield at which it is will-
ing to buy the security.The bidder certainly has no reason to
bid a lower yield,but if the auction stops at a higher yield it
will get the full benefit of buying at that higher yield.In con-
trast,the multiple-price format encourages a participant to
bid higher than its reservation yield in hopes of getting the
security on more favorable terms.
Whether the Treasury would be better off selling securi-
ties in a single-price format or a multiple-price format was a
matter that could only be resolved by empirical analysis.7 In
September 1992,the Treasury announced that,in an experi-
ment,it would begin to auction two-year notes and five-year
notes in the single-price format.It subsequently produced
two empirical studies analyzing the results of the experi-
ment (see Box 2).Although the evidence was not unambigu-
ous,the Treasury decided in October 1998 that it justified
extending the single-price format to all auction offerings.
Restrictions on auction awards to competitive bidders.
In the interest of fostering a liquid post-auction secondary
market for a new issue,the Treasury limits the maximum
auction award to a single bidder to 35 percent of the offering,
less the bidder’s “reportable net long position”in the secu-
rity.A bidder’s net long position is the sum,as of one-half
hour before the close of bidding,of
(a) when-issued, forward, and futures contracts for the
security and for principal STRIPS to be derived from the
security (STRIPS—an acronym for Separate Trading
of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities—
are single-payment claims for the respective interest
and principal payments from a coupon-bearing
security) and
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On Wednesday, August 25, 2004, the Treasury auctioned
$24 billion of two-year notes that would be issued on
August 31 and that would mature on August 31, 2006. It
received noncompetitive bids for $994,798,000 of the notes,
and competitive bids for $51,580,904,000.
After allocating enough notes to satisfy the noncompeti-
tive bids, the Treasury had $23,005,202,000 notes remain-
ing to be sold to competitive bidders. Accepting bids in
order of increasing yield, the Treasury stopped at a yield of
2.494 percent. All bids specifying yields below 2.494 per-
cent were accepted in full; a bid at 2.494 percent was allo-
cated 32.34 percent of the amount specified. (The allocation
at the stop is the ratio of (a) the quantity of securities that
remain to be sold at the stop to (b) the quantity bid at the
stop, rounded up to two digits to the right of the decimal
point.) At that allocation, the Treasury actually sold a total
of $23,005,209,000 notes to competitive bidders.
The highest coupon rate that did not produce a price
greater than 100 percent of principal was 2 3/8 percent. At
that coupon rate, the price of the notes, rounded to three
digits to the right of the decimal point, was 99.769 percent
of principal.a
aIn September 2004,the Treasury began to compute invoice prices to six
digits of precision to the right of the decimal point.See the Treasury’s
“August 2004 Quarterly Refunding Statement,”August 4,2004,available at
<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1825.htm>.
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(b) the excess,if any,of (1) its net holdings of previously
issued securities with the same identifying CUSIP num-
ber8 and principal STRIPS derived from such securities
over (2) an exclusion amount equal to 35 percent of the
aggregate amount of previously issued securities with
the same CUSIP number.
A bidder must report its net long position along with its
auction bids if the sum of its net long position and its bids
exceeds 35 percent of the offering.
Limitations on auction awards go back more than forty
years.A limitation was first imposed following an auction of
thirteen-week bills in August 1962,when Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company bid for half of the bills offered.To avoid a
market “disruption,” Secretary of the Treasury Douglas
Dillon exercised his right to reject any tender in whole or in
part and reduced Morgan’s award to 25 percent of the amount
offered. He stated that, going forward, no bidder would be
awarded more than 25 percent of a bill offering.9 Limitations
on auction awards were subsequently understood to apply to
all offerings of marketable Treasury securities.
Limitations on auction awards have been modified sev-
eral times since 1962 in response to innovations such as
futures trading and STRIPS.Box 3 contains a summary of
the modifications.
Limitations on the size of a bid. Although the maximum
award to an individual bidder has been limited since 1962,
before 1990 there was no limit on the size of a bid.Because
bids at the stop are filled on a pro rata basis,bidders could
get larger awards (subject to the 35 percent limitation) if
they bid (at what turned out to be the stop) for more securi-
ties.For example,if a dealer wanted $100 million of a new
issue at a yield equal to what the dealer expected would be
the stop,the dealer might bid for $200 million if it expected a
50 percent allotment.Such “strategic”bidding led to individual
bids for more securities than were offered in an auction of
four-year notes in June 1990.10
Strategic bidding by some large auction market partici-
pants made competitive bidding riskier and more compli-
cated for other participants.Bidders had to anticipate the
likely volume of overbidding;if the expected overbidding did
not materialize,they would end up owning more securities
than they wanted.In the interest of encouraging broad pub-
lic participation in its auctions,the Treasury announced in
July 1990 that it would limit the total bids by a given partici-
pant at a given yield or discount rate to 35 percent of the
amount offered to the public.
Granularity of bidding.When the Treasury introduced bid-
ding on notes and bonds in terms ofyields in 1974,it specified
that bids should be expressed to a whole basis point.11When it
introduced bidding on bills in terms of discount rates in 1983,
it made a similar stipulation.12 Bidding to a whole basis point
continued until 1995,when Treasury officials specified that
bids on notes and bonds should be expressed to 1/10 of1 basis
point.The greater precision was intended to “increase partici-
pation in Treasury auctions and to conform the auctions to
market practice for when-issued trading.”13 Officials refined
the bidding increment to 1/2 of 1 basis point in late 1997 for
thirteen-,twenty-six-,and fifty-two-week bills and in April
2002 for cash management bills,saying that they expected the
change “to promote more efficient and aggressive bidding and
lead to marginally higher revenue.”14
4
The Treasury produced two empirical studies of the results
of its experiment with a single-price auction format: Malvey,
Archibald, and Flynn (1995) and Malvey and Archibald
(1998). The studies calculated—for both single-price and
multiple-price auctions—the difference between the auction
yield of a security and the yield at which the same security
was trading in the when-issued market at the time of the
auction. A positive difference indicated that the securities
had been auctioned at a yield higher than the one at which
they were trading in the when-issued market. For securities
auctioned in a multiple-price format, the average difference
was statistically significantly greater than zero. For securities
auctioned in a single-price format, however, the studies were
unable to reject the hypothesis that the average difference
was zero. These results suggest that moving to a single-price
format would lead to lower financing costs. Nevertheless,
the studies were also unable to reject the hypothesis that
changing auction formats would leave the average difference
unchanged. The apparent inconsistency arose because the
differences between auction yields and when-issued yields in
single-price auctions were quite volatile. The studies could
neither reject the hypothesis that the average difference in
single-price auctions was different from zero, nor could they
reject the hypothesis that the average difference was differ-
ent from the (positive) average difference that characterized
multiple-price auctions.
The studies also examined whether single-price auctions
reduced the concentration of auction awards. The studies
found that the single-price format did not materially affect
the distribution of awards between dealers and others but
that it did lead to a lower concentration of auction awards to
the largest dealers.
Box 2
Treasury Assessments of the Single-Price
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The limitation on auction awards to a single bidder has
been modified several times since it was introduced in
1962. The modifications reflect the emergence of new
financial instruments and changes in investor behavior and
Treasury debt management practices.
In May 1979, the Treasury reduced the maximum award
from 25 percent of the amount offered to 25 percent of the
amount sold to public bidders—thereby excluding securi-
ties sold to foreign official institutions and to the Federal
Reserve System in exchange for maturing securities.
Treasury officials made the change because “the proportion
of Treasury bill offerings accounted for by the competitive
plus noncompetitive award to the public has declined sig-
nificantly in recent years” and said they expected the
change would “broaden the competitiveness of the auction
process and contribute to improved distribution of new
securities.”a
Also in May 1979, the Treasury introduced the concept
of a net long position to address certain consequences of the
growth of when-issued trading and trading in Treasury bill
futures contracts. The Treasury was concerned that when-
issued contracts and futures contracts on a new bill were
such close substitutes for auction awards that a combination
of a large award and a concentrated position in when-issued
and/or futures contracts could impair the liquidity of post-
auction secondary market trading.b It defined a net long
position to include when-issued contracts, bill futures con-
tracts, and net holdings of previously issued bills with the
same maturity date. The maximum award of bills would be
reduced (from 25 percent of the amount sold to public bid-
ders) by the bidder’s net long position in a bill if that net
long position exceeded $200 million. In 1981, the Treasury
extended the deduction for a bidder’s net long position to
note and bond auctions and relaxed the percentage limita-
tion to 35 percent.
In 1985, following the rapid growth of trading in pri-
vate sector custodial receipts on individual interest and
principal payments on Treasury notes and bonds, the
Treasury introduced STRIPS. Because a principal STRIP
remains identified with the security from which it was
derived, and because STRIPS can be reconstituted into
notes and bonds, principal STRIPS created a substitutabil-
ity problem similar to that created by when-issued con-
tracts and futures contracts. In 1993, the Treasury
expanded the definition of a bidder’s net long position to
include purchase commitments for principal STRIPS to be
derived from the security being auctioned as well as hold-
ings of principal STRIPS derived from previously issued
securities with the same CUSIP number.
In February 2000, the Treasury announced that it would
henceforth issue new five-year and ten-year notes semi-
annually and that it would reopen each new five- or ten-
year note in a smaller offering three months after it was first
issued. Because the net long position in a security included
holdings of previously issued securities with the same
CUSIP number, a bidder with a significant position in ear-
lier issued notes was liable to be limited to an unreasonably
low maximum auction award. Suppose, for example, the
Treasury sold $10 billion of a note in an earlier auction and
then reopened the note by auctioning another $8 billion. If
an investor held $2.5 billion of the previous issue, it could
not be awarded more than $300 million of the new issue
($0.3 billion = 35 percent of the $8 billion new offering,
less the investor’s net long position of $2.5 billion), even
though it would then hold only 15.5 percent of the com-
bined issue ($2.8 billion = 15.5 percent of $18 billion). To
relax this constraint, the Treasury provided in November
2001 that a bidder had to include in its net long position
only those holdings of previously issued securities with the
same CUSIP number that were in excess of 35 percent of
the total amount of such earlier issued securities. In the
example, the investor’s holdings of previously issued notes
did not exceed 35 percent of the total earlier issue, so it did
not have a reportable net long position and could be
awarded up to 35 percent ($2.8 billion) of the new issue.
In light of changes in the size of its auctions, the
Treasury has periodically revised the threshold for reporting
a net long position. In 1993 it increased the threshold to
$2 billion, in 1997 it reduced the threshold for bills to
$1 billion, and in 2002 it changed the threshold for all
securities to 35 percent of the amount offered.
Box 3
Evolution of Restrictions on Auction Awards
aFederal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no.8577,May 23,1979.In the first auction of thirteen-week bills under the new tighter limits,the Treasury offered
$2.9 billion of bills but only $1.3 billion went to public bidders (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no.8589,June 20,1979).
bTreasury officials stated that they were acting to reduce “the potential for undue concentration of ownership in new issues and to contribute to improved
distribution.”The decision to act was reached  “in conjunction with the joint Treasury/Federal Reserve Board study of futures contracts based on Treasury securities”
(see U.S.Department of the Treasury and Federal Reserve System [1979]) and “recognizes the rapid expansion of trading in Treasury bill futures as well as ‘when-
issued’trading”(Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no.8577,May 23,1979).CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 11, NUMBER 2
Auction Infrastructure
The operational heart of a Treasury auction is a computer
application called TAAPS® (Treasury Automated Auction
Processing System).After the close of noncompetitive bidding,
TAAPS aggregates the noncompetitive bids and computes
the balance of the offering that must be sold to competitive
bidders.Once the competitive bidding closes,TAAPS ranks the
competitive bids in order of increasing yield or discount rate,
identifies the stop,and identifies the allocation at the stop.It
then prepares a summary data file of the auction results that is
made available to news services and a more descriptive text file
that is posted on the website of the Treasury Department’s
Bureau of the Public Debt (<http://www.publicdebt.treas
.gov/>).News bulletins reporting the results usually appear
within two to three minutes of the close of competitive bid-
ding. TAAPS subsequently prepares a notice of award for
each successful bid,identifying how many securities were
awarded and at what price.
Auction market participants submit bids through a com-
munications system called TAAPSLink®.Institutions other
than primary dealers15 (including depository institutions,
other dealers,and institutional investors) use an Internet
version called TAAPSLink v1.Primary dealers—which sub-
mit the largest volume of bids in almost every auction—use
an alternative version called TAAPSLink v2.Retail investors
with TreasuryDirect accounts submit bids by mail, tele-
phone, and Internet applications that ultimately reach
TAAPS through TAAPSLinkv1.
The last decade witnessed striking advances in bid sub-
mission, bid processing, and announcement of auction
results.Until 1993,bids were submitted on paper forms by
mail or in person at the Treasury Department in Washington,
D.C.,or at a Federal Reserve Bank or Branch.Dealers had a lot
to lose if they tendered bids early at prices that failed to reflect
a late-developing rally or market pullback, so on auction
days they stationed employees in the lobby of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and relayed bidding instructions
over the telephone immediately before the close of bidding.
Other large bidders submitted bids through primary dealers
acting on their behalf.Bids were processed manually and
announcements of auction results frequently came out in
mid or late afternoon.16 These procedures left auction mar-
ket participants uncertain—for substantial intervals of
time—whether they would be awarded securities. The
uncertainty may have led them to enter bids at higher yields
than they would have if auction results had been announced
more promptly.
The introduction of electronic bid submission and bid
processing in the 1990s was stimulated by the 1991 viola-
tions of Treasury auction rules noted earlier and resulting
demands for a faster,more transparent,and more accessible
auction process.17Electronic processing dramatically reduced
the time between the close of bidding and the announce-
ment of results,thus materially reducing bidder risk expo-
sure.In early 2002,the Treasury announced that it intended
to release auction results consistently within two minutes of
the close of bidding,and in mid-2003 it achieved that goal.18
Electronic bid submission was a necessary precondition to
electronic processing.It also made it operationally feasible
for auction market participants other than primary dealers
to bid directly (rather than through a dealer) right up to the
close of competitive bidding—auction access that the
Treasury believes can help maximize the breadth of the auc-
tion market.19
Delivery and Settlement
The last part of the auction process is delivering new securities
to successful bidders and collecting payment.Participating
institutional and retail investors take delivery directly from
the Treasury.However,the Treasury makes about three-quarters
ofall auction deliveries to dealers indirectly,through the Fixed
Income Clearing Corporation (FICC),a  clearing agency regis-
tered with the Securities and Exchange Commission that is
the central clearing corporation for the Treasury securities
market.20 In 2003,for example,89 percent of all four-week
bills and 67 percent of all ten-year notes were delivered
through FICC.
Direct deliveries. The simplest example of a direct delivery
occurs when a bidder is a depository institution and
requests that awards be credited to its account in the Federal
Reserve book-entry system.At 9:15 a.m.on the issue date,
the Fed,acting as fiscal agent for the Treasury,credits the
institution’s account for the new securities,debits the insti-
tution’s reserve account for the cost of the securities,and
transfers the payment to a Treasury account at the Fed.
If an institutional bidder is not a depository institution,it
will usually request that securities be delivered pursuant to
an “autocharge”agreement with a depository institution that
does a custodial business.The agreement provides that the
securities will be credited to the custodian’s book-entry
account and that payment will be collected from the custo-
dian’s reserve account.The bidder reimburses the custodian
for the cost of the securities,and the custodian credits the
securities to the bidder’s account on its internal records.
Retail investors that take delivery in their TreasuryDirect
accounts commonly pay by check, by a debit entry to a
deposit account,or with the proceeds from a maturing secu-
rity in the same account.
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Deliveries through FICC. FICC was organized in the late
1980s to reduce operational costs and enhance risk man-
agement practices in settling secondary market transactions
in Treasury and related fixed-income securities. Among
other things,FICC nets out confirmed purchases and sales,
repurchase agreements, and reverse repurchase agree-
ments21between its members and,in a legal process known
as “novation,”steps in as the buyer from every net seller and
the seller to every net buyer.Additionally,FICC marks pur-
chase and sale contracts to current market prices every day
in order to limit the exposure of its members and itself to
credit risk.
Before 1994,the Treasury settled an auction award to a
dealer that was an FICC member in the same way that it set-
tled an auction award to any other institutional investor: by
delivering securities to the dealer’s Federal Reserve book-
entry account or to the book-entry account of the dealer’s
custodian. This process was inefficient because in many
cases the dealer had already sold some or all of its award in
when-issued transactions.Suppose,for example,that dealer A
was awarded $10 million of a new issue and that,in when-
issued trading before or after the auction,the dealer sold
$10 million of the same issue to dealer B.On the issue date,
the Fed would deliver $10 million of the security to dealer A,
which would then have to go to the trouble and expense of
redelivering the security to dealer B.
In 1991,FICC opened discussions with the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve to expand its netting,settlement,and
risk management services to include auction awards, or
“takedowns.” The 1992 Joint Report on the Government
Securities Market encouraged the effort, noting that “the
benefits of netting are greater as more trades are included in
the net,because a greater number of receive and deliver obli-
gations are reduced to as small a number as possible”(U.S.
Department of the Treasury et al.1992,p.B-76).
FICC initiated its “auction takedown service” in
September 1994.The key idea of the service is that auction
awards, when-issued purchases, and the starting legs of
reverse repurchase agreements are equivalent for purposes
of netting and settlement.Additionally,as shown in the table
below,if a new issue reopens an outstanding security,auc-
tion awards are also equivalent to conventional purchases of
securities with the same CUSIP number,as well as to the
closing legs of repurchase agreements.On the issue date,the
Fed delivers to FICC securities equal to the aggregate awards
of its members.FICC redelivers those securities,along with
securities received from members with a net short position,
to members with a net long position. Thus, the auction
awards lose their separate identities and become part of a
consolidated net settlement process.22
In addition to enhancing operating efficiency,the auction
takedown service has resolved several risk management
problems associated with gross settlement of auction
awards.First,the unnecessary deliveries to dealers that were
not ultimate buyers created risk for FICC because FICC guar-
anteed settlement of the redeliveries by those dealers.If an
“intermediary”dealer became insolvent before redelivering
its securities and the price of the securities had risen,FICC,as
part ofits liquidation ofthe insolvent dealer’s positions,might
have to go into the secondary market and buy the securities at
a higher price than it would receive upon redelivery.Second,
because FICC did not have knowledge ofauction awards made
to its netting members,it could not guarantee settlement of
those awards (as it would for a secondary market trade),
thus leaving the Treasury exposed to credit risk. Finally,
FICC was unable to assess proper performance guarantees,
Netting Auction Awards and When-Issued Transactions with Repurchase Agreements
For netting purposes,FICC treats the settlements associated with the starting leg of a reverse repurchase agreement (in which the lender of funds has to pay money upon
delivery of securities from the borrower of funds) and the closing leg of a repurchase agreement (in which the borrower of funds has to pay money upon delivery of securities
from the lender of funds) as long positions.Similarly,the settlements associated with repo starting legs and reverse repo closing legs are treated as short positions.The
difference between a member’s aggregate long position and its aggregate short position is the member’s net settlement obligation.
Long Positions Short Positions
Purchases (due to when-issued transactions and,in the case of a
reopening,transactions in previously issued securities with the same
CUSIP number)
Starting legs of reverse repurchase agreements
Closing legs of repurchase agreements involving previously issued
securities with the same CUSIP number
Auction awards
Aggregate long position minus
Sales (due to when-issued transactions and,in the case of a
reopening,transactions in previously issued securities with the
same CUSIP number)
Starting legs of repurchase agreements
Closing legs of reverse repurchase agreements involving previously
issued securities with the same CUSIP number
Aggregate short position  equals Net settlement obligationCURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 11, NUMBER 2
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FICC limits the exposure of its members and itself to credit
risk arising from when-issued trading by marking to mar-
ket when-issued purchase and sale contracts every day until
settlement. The appendix box on page 9 shows how the
contracts are marked. Note, in particular, the symmetric
consequences of price changes: a buyer pays forward margin
when the market price falls below the initial contract price
(but makes it back by paying a lower invoice price when
the seller delivers the securities) and a seller pays forward
margin when the market price rises above the initial con-
tract price (but makes it back by receiving a higher invoice
price when delivering the securities).
Because the U.S. Treasury is not a member of FICC, its
sale contracts to FICC members are not marked to market
and it neither makes nor receives forward margin payments.
This feature of the auction takedown service leads to more
complicated margining procedures for auction awards to
FICC members. To appreciate some of the complexities,
consider two cases similar to those described in the appendix
box, except that the seller is the Treasury instead of a dealer.
Auction Takedowns
Suppose dealer X receives an auction award at a price of
$100. Following novation, the Treasury will be obligated to
deliver the security to FICC at a price of $100 and FICC will
be obligated to deliver the security to X at the same price:
If the price of the security falls to $95 following the auc-
tion, X (the buyer) pays $5 forward margin to FICC and
FICC marks the settlement price on X’s purchase contract
to $95. However, FICC does not revise the settlement price
on the Treasury’s sale contract and it does not pay the $5 to
the Treasury. Instead, it invests the $5. This leaves the con-
tracts as
At 9:15 a.m. on the issue date, the Fed delivers the secu-
rity to FICC against payment of $100. FICC redelivers the
security to X against payment of the same amount and
issues a $5 “delivery differential credit” to X. (Invoicing X
$100 instead of $95 is important because the higher
invoice price paid by X provides FICC with the cash needed
to pay the Treasury. FICC always redelivers securities
received from the Treasury at the higher of the auction
price and the current market price to avoid liquidity
strains.) Before 11 a.m. on the same day, FICC uses the $5
received earlier from X to pay off the delivery differential
credit. This leaves X as a buyer of the new issue at a net
price of $100 ($100 = $100 paid upon delivery of the secu-
rity, plus $5 forward margin paid when the market price of
the security fell from $100 to $95, less $5 received in satis-
faction of the delivery differential credit).
If the price of the security rises from $100 to $105 fol-
lowing the auction, FICC marks the settlement price on X’s
purchase contract to $105. However, because it does not
collect any forward margin from the Treasury, it does not
have $5 in cash to compensate X for the increase in the
invoice price. In lieu of cash, FICC issues X a $5 delivery
differential credit. This leaves the contracts as
Appendix: Marking to Market and Settling Auction Takedowns through FICC
or margin,on purchasers and sellers,and it could not mark
their positions to market accurately.For example,if dealer A
was awarded $10 million of a security in an auction and
sold $10 million of the same security in a when-issued
transaction to dealer B,FICC viewed dealer A as having a
$10 million net short position and collected margin on that
position,whereas in fact the dealer was net flat and posed
no settlement risk. The unnecessary margin reduced the
dealer’s liquidity.The auction takedown service allows FICC
to margin and mark dealer positions on a true net basis.
However, because the Treasury is not a member of FICC,
FICC does not mark the Treasury’s sales contracts to mar-
ket.As explained in the appendix,this feature of the auction
takedown service complicates marking procedures for auc-
tion awards to FICC members.
Conclusion
The process of auctioning Treasury securities has changed
substantially in the last quarter century. In 1980, when-
issued trading was banned,bids were submitted on paper
tenders, a multiple-price format was used, results were
announced hours after the close of bidding,and securities
were delivered to successful bidders regardless of whether or
not a bidder was actually a net buyer for settlement on the
issue date.Since then,growing confidence in free markets
has fostered when-issued trading,improvements in telecom-
munications and information processing have led to more
equitable bidding and faster bid processing,and net settle-
ment has led to cheaper and safer settlements.These adapta-
tions have contributed,individually and collectively,to the
goal of minimizing the cost of financing the national debt.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 9
At 9:15 a.m. on the issue date, the Fed delivers the secu-
rity to FICC against payment of $100 and FICC redelivers
the security to X against payment of $105. Later in the
morning, FICC pays off the delivery differential credit
issued earlier to X with the difference between what X paid
to FICC ($105) and what FICC paid to the Treasury ($100).
Integrating When-Issued Trades with Auction Takedowns
One of the important benefits of FICC’s auction takedown
service is that, as shown in the table on page 7, it integrates
settlement obligations arising out of interdealer when-
issued trading with dealer auction takedowns. This integra-
tion introduces further complexities into the process of
marking dealer commitments to market.
Suppose that dealer X receives an auction award for a
security at a price of $100 and that the price of the security
falls to $95 following the auction. After X has paid $5 for-
ward margin to FICC and FICC has invested the $5 and
marked the settlement price on X’s purchase contract to
$95, the contracts involving the Treasury, FICC, and X are
Suppose that X now agrees to sell the security to dealer Y
in a when-issued transaction at a price of $95. Y replaces X
as the buyer from FICC, leaving X with no net settlement
obligation. If the market price of the security falls further,
to $92, Y (the new buyer) pays $3 forward margin to FICC
and FICC marks the settlement price on Y’s purchase con-
tract to $92. As before, FICC does not revise the settlement
price on the Treasury’s sale contract and it does not pay the
$3 to the Treasury. Instead, it invests the $3. This leaves the
contracts as
At 9:15 a.m. on the issue date, the Fed delivers the secu-
rity to FICC against payment of $100. FICC redelivers the
security to Y against payment of the same amount and
issues Y an $8 delivery differential credit. Later in the
morning, FICC uses the $5 received from X and the $3
received from Y to pay off the delivery differential credit
issued to Y. This leaves Y as a net buyer of the new issue at
a price of $95 ($95 = $100 paid upon delivery of the secu-
rity, plus $3 forward margin paid when the market price of
the issue fell from $95 to $92, less $8 received in satisfac-
tion of the delivery differential credit).
Suppose alternatively that dealer X receives an auction
award for a security at a price of $100 and that the price of
the security rises to $105 following the auction. After FICC
has marked the settlement price on X’s purchase contract to
$105 and issued a $5 delivery differential credit to X, the
contracts involving the Treasury, FICC, and X are
Suppose that X now agrees to sell the security to dealer Y
in a when-issued transaction at a price of $105. Y replaces X
as the buyer from FICC. If the market price of the security
rises further, to $108, X (the original auction buyer and the
seller to Y on the when-issued contract) pays $3 forward
margin to FICC and receives an additional $3 delivery dif-
ferential credit. (X pays forward margin on its when-issued
sale to Y for the same reason that, in the appendix box, A
pays forward margin on its when-issued sale to B when the
price of the security rises. X does not receive $3 forward
margin on its purchase contract because that contract was
with the Treasury. Instead, it receives an additional $3
Marking to Market and Settling a When-
Issued Trade between Two FICC Members
Suppose initially that dealer A agrees to sell a security to
dealer B in a when-issued transaction at a price of $100.
Following novation of the trade, A will be obligated to
deliver the security to FICC at a price of $100 and FICC
will be obligated to deliver the security to B at the same
price:
Suppose first that the price of the security falls to $95
in subsequent when-issued trading. Dealer B then pays
$5 forward margin to FICC, FICC pays $5 to A, and the
settlement prices on A’s sale contract and B’s purchase
contract are marked to $95. On the issue date of the secu-
rity, A delivers the security to FICC against payment of
$95 and FICC redelivers the security to B against pay-
ment of the same amount. Between the delivery payment
and the earlier forward margin payment, B pays a total of
$100 and A receives a total of $100.
Suppose alternatively that the price of the security
rises to $105 after the initial transaction between A and
B. Dealer A then pays $5 forward margin to FICC, FICC
pays $5 to B, and the settlement prices on the contracts
are marked from $100 to $105. On the issue date of the
new security, A delivers the security to FICC against pay-
ment of $105 and FICC redelivers the security to B
against payment of the same amount. Between the deliv-
ery payment and the earlier margin payment, B pays a
total of $100 and A receives a total of $100.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 11, NUMBER 2
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1. Under Secretary of the Treasury Peter Fisher identified lowest cost over time
as the goal of Treasury debt management in a speech on March 14,2002,avail-
able at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po1098.htm>.
2. Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets Brian Roseboro observed that
secondary market liquidity is important because it encourages “more aggres-
sive bidding in the primary market” (“A Review of Treasury’s Debt
Management Policy,” June 3, 2002, available at <http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/po3149.htm>).
3. Beginning with the first auction of Treasury notes in 1970,the Treasury
restricted pre-auction when-issued trading in coupon-bearing securities
(Garbade 2004,pp.38-9).The Treasury removed the restriction in 1975 when it
revised the boilerplate language of its offering circulars to eliminate “obsolete”
provisions,but reimposed the restriction in 1977 after concluding that when-
issued trading “ does not contribute to the efficient marketing ofnew ...issues
and may,in fact,facilitate undesirable speculative activity”(Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Circular no.8147,July 15,1977).Greater volatility of interest
rates after October 1979 and a growing federal deficit led the Treasury to lift
the ban a second time in 1981.On this occasion,the Treasury characterized the
restriction as “an unnecessary regulation which is believed to hinder the effi-
cient adjustment of market prices”(Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular
no.9128,August 17,1981).
4. Treasury auction rules appear in the Uniform Offering Circular (Code of
Federal Regulations,title 31,part 356,“Sale and Issue of Marketable Book-
Entry Treasury Bills,Notes,and Bonds”).
5. All times in this article are eastern times.
6. However, a competitive bidder is limited to an award of no more than
35 percent of the total amount offered less,as described in more detail below,
the bidder’s reportable net long position in the security.
7. See U.S.Department of the Treasury et al.(1992,p.14).The Treasury used a
single-price format to auction long-term bonds on six occasions in 1973 and
1974,but switched to a multiple-price format in August 1974; it did not state
publicly the reason for the change. In 1982, Mark Stalnecker, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance, testified before the House
Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy that it “did not appear that there
were significant cost savings ...,so that after selling six securities [with the
single-price auction format] with mixed results we ended that experiment”
(U.S.House 1982,p.24).A decade later,Jack Bennett,who had been the Under
Secretary for Monetary Affairs in August 1974,recalled that “the Secretary of
the Treasury at that time,William E.Simon,made the decision to discontinue
the [single-price format] as a result of his judgment,based on his extensive
experience in the market for Treasury securities,that the [single-price format]
would bring in fewer dollars to the Treasury”(U.S.House 1991,p.409).Simon
(1994b) examines whether the Treasury received more aggressive bids in the
six single-price auctions or the ten multiple-price auctions of long-term bonds
held between February 1973 and August 1976.
8. CUSIP (Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures) num-
bers uniquely identify and distinguish most publicly traded securities,including
corporate stocks and bonds,municipal bonds,and U.S.government securities.
9. See “Effort to Corner U.S.Bills Hinted,”New York Times,August 29,1962,
p.35;“Morgan Guaranty Denies Move to Corner 91-Day-Bill Auction,”New
York Times,August 30,1962,p.37; and “Demand Is Heavy for 91-Day Bills,”
New York Times,September 2,1962,sec.3,p.1.
10. See “Unfillable Bids Flood Auction of 7-Year Notes,”Wall Street Journal,
July 12,1990,p.C1; and “Treasury’s Rule Upsets Note Sale,”New York Times,
July 12,1990,p.D1.
11. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no.7456,September 16,1974.
The Treasury changed the bidding method for notes and bonds from prices to
yields to limit the likelihood of a failed auction (Garbade 2004,p.39).
12. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no.9480,April 13,1983.The
Treasury changed the bidding method for bills from prices to discount rates “to
conform the bidding in Treasury bill auctions to market pricing conventions and
simplify the submission of tenders”(“Treasury Bill Auctions to Use New Bidding
Method Effective April 18,1983,”Treasury News,March 15,1983).
13. “Treasury Modifies Competitive Bidding Requirement for Notes and Bonds,”
Treasury Bulletin,June 1995,p.33.
14. “Treasury Is Altering Format of Bill Auctions,”Wall Street Journal,August 13,
1997,p.C21.
15. Primary dealers are dealers that have a trading relationship with the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.Information on the primary dealer program is avail-
able at <http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers.html>.
16. Before 1984,results were generally announced more than two and a half
hours after the close of bidding. By the early 1990s, results were typically
announced about an hour after the close.See Cammack (1991,Figure 1),Simon
(1994a,p.46),and Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996,p.71).
17. U.S.Department of the Treasury et al.(1992,p.13).
18. “Remarks by Peter R.Fisher,Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic
Finance,before the Bond Market Association Legal and Compliance Conference,”
January 8,2002,available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po906.htm>;
“August 2003 Quarterly Refunding Statement,” July 30, 2003, available at
<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js581.htm>.
delivery differential credit.) FICC pays the $3 (received
from X) to Y and marks the settlement price on Y’s pur-
chase contract to $108. This leaves the contracts as
At 9:15 a.m. on the issue date, the Fed delivers the secu-
rity to FICC against payment of $100 and FICC redelivers
the security to Y against payment of $108. Later in the
morning, FICC uses the difference between what Y paid to
FICC ($108) and what FICC paid to the Treasury ($100) to
pay off the $5 and $3 delivery differential credits issued to X.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 11
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19. “Remarks of Under Secretary of the Treasury Peter R.Fisher to the Council
of Institutional Investors,” March 25, 2002, available at <http://www.treas
.gov/press/releases/po2031.htm>.
20. FICC is a subsidiary of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation and has
two divisions—the Government Securities Division (formerly the Government
Securities Clearing Corporation) and the Mortgage-Backed Securities Division
(formerly the Mortgage-Backed Securities Clearing Corporation).In this article,
“FICC”refers only to the Government Securities Division of FICC.
21. A repurchase agreement involves two separate but related transactions:an
agreement by the “seller”to transfer securities in exchange for cash to the “buyer,”
and a simultaneous agreement by the seller to repurchase the same or equivalent
securities from the buyer for a specified price at a specified later date.Market par-
ticipants discuss repurchase agreements using two additional phrases—“repo”
and “reverse repo.”A repurchase agreement from the seller’s viewpoint is a repo.
Thus,the repo party is effectively borrowing money and lending securities.A
repurchase agreement from the buyer’s viewpoint is a reverse repo.The reverse
repo party is effectively lending money and borrowing securities.
22. The auction takedown service has two limitations:it does not cover pur-
chases by a dealer acting as an agent for a customer,and it does not encompass
securities (such as some cash management bills) that are issued on the auction
date.It should also be noted that the takedown service nets out dealer sales only
to participating netting members,so dealers still have to redeliver securities to
settle when-issued sales to nonmembers.
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